The continuity of States' financial obligations is among the most significant and controversial issues in international law, particularly when political regimes undergo fundamental change. Focusing on Iran's financial claims against Syria and Venezuela, this article examines whether a change in a State's political regime may extinguish its obligation to discharge foreign debts. It first traces the historical evolution of States' efforts to recover financial claims and the development of the relevant rules of international law. It then distinguishes between State succession and continuity of the State, and analyzes the legal characterization of the government overthrow. The study argues that a change of government—even when resulting from revolution, armed insurgency, or other profound political transformations—does not constitute State succession so long as the international legal personality of the State continues to exist; rather, it falls within the doctrine of State continuity. Accordingly, the State's international rights and obligations, including its legitimate financial debts, remain unaffected and are binding upon the successor government. Consequently, a mere change in political regime does not provide a valid legal basis for refusing to discharge financial obligations owed to other States.